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Quantum key distribution using three states in equiangular configuration combines a security
threshold comparable with the one of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol and a quantum bit
error rate (QBER) estimation that does not need to reveal part of the key. We implement an
entanglement-based version of the Renes 2004 protocol, using only passive optic elements in a lin-
ear scheme for the measurement POVM, generating an asymptotic secure key rate of more than
10 kbit/s, with a mean QBER of 1.6%. We then demonstrate its security in the case of finite key
and evaluate the key rate for both collective and general attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows two remote
parties, Alice and Bob, to generate a secret shared string
of bits, that can be used for symmetric cryptography or
other cryptographic protocols. Unlike classical key dis-
tribution, whose security is based on the computational
difficulty of solving certain classes of problems, the secu-
rity of quantum key distribution comes from the impos-
sibility for an eavesdropper (Eve) to acquire information
about an exchanged state without perturbing it. This
goal is obtained by using non-orthogonal states, as in the
first QKD protocol, introduced by Bennett and Brassard
in 1984 (BB84), that uses four different states of two
mutually unbiased bases [1]. In 1992, Bennett showed
that two non-orthogonal states are sufficient for QKD
[2]. This protocol, however, has the drawback that the
secure key rate is strongly affected by losses: indeed, Eve
can extract information by increasing the losses and per-
forming the so called unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack [3, 4]. The addition of a third state is suf-
ficient to make the B92 protocol unconditionally secure
independently from the noise in the quantum channel
[5, 6]: however, rates comparable to the BB84 protocols
can be obtained only when four states are detected at the
receiver.
The optimal three-state QKD protocol, introduced
in 2000 by Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles (PBC00) [7], uses
states that form an equilateral triangle in the X-Z plane
of the Bloch sphere. The symmetry of this protocol can
indeed be exploited to obtain rates comparable with the
BB84 protocol but requiring only three detectors instead
of four. This protocol, however, still requires the pub-
lic exchange of part of the sifted key in order to esti-
mate the QBER. An improvement of this protocol, intro-
duced by Renes in 2004 (R04) [8], estimates the error rate
from the number of inconclusive events, thus allowing to
use all conclusive ones for key extraction. The uncon-
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ditional security of the PBC00 has been demonstrated,
in the asymptotic case, in 2005 [9], for a bit error rate
of up to 9.81 %. The security of the PBC00 has been
demonstrated also in the case of finite key [10], using the
framework introduced by Scarani and Renner [11] and
the postselection technique [12]. Their work, however,
does not consider the security of the R04 protocol, there-
fore excluding one of the most interesting features of this
class of symmetrical codes. Despite all these theoretical
results, no experimental implementation of equiangular
three state QKD protocols has been reported so far. The
measurement apparatus proposed in the original work
implements the trine measurement using an interferomet-
ric setup at the receiver [7]. This scheme requires careful
alignment [13, 14] and is not assured to have the long
term stability required by Quantum Key Distribution (a
stability of about half an hour is reported in [14]). A
new experimental scheme implementing the trine mea-
surement using only passive optical elements has been
proposed in [15]. Using this apparatus, we demonstrate
the feasibility of equiangular three state QKD and assess
its key generation rate, both in the asymptotic limit of
infinite key and taking into account finite key effects.
II. RESULTS
A. Protocol
The R04 protocol uses three quantum states,
{|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉}, placed in an equilateral triangle
in the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere, as shown in
Figure 1. The states are grouped into three dif-
ferent sets, S1 = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉}, S2 = {|ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉},
and S3 = {|ψ3〉 , |ψ1〉}. In each set, the first state
is associated with the bit 0 and the second with
the bit 1. Differently from other QKD protocols,
each state brings no information about its associated
bit before the information about the used set is disclosed.
We implemented an entanglement-based version of the
protocol, using polarization-entangled photon pairs in
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FIG. 1. States used in the R04 protocol (above) and POVM
{Πi} used for the measurement (below). The states lie in the
X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere. They are grouped into the sets
S1 = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉}, S2 = {|ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉}, and S3 = {|ψ3〉 , |ψ1〉},
where the first element of each set corresponds to bit 0 and
the second to bit 1. The POVM is implemented by using a
partially polarizing beam-splitter (pPBS), a half-wave plate
(HWP) at 22.5◦ and a polarizing beam-splitter (PBS).
the singlet state
|Ψ−〉 = |H〉A |V 〉B − |V 〉A |H〉B√
2
, (1)
where the subscripts A and B indicate the photons going
to, respectively, Alice’s and Bob’s detection apparatus.
In this state, photons A and B are anti-correlated in any
measurement basis. Alice measures photon A using the
POVM {Πi ≡ 23 |ψ⊥i 〉 〈ψ⊥i |}, with |ψ⊥1 〉 = |V 〉, |ψ⊥2 〉 =√
3
2 |H〉 − 12 |V 〉, |ψ⊥3 〉 =
√
3
2 |H〉+ 12 |V 〉. In our notation
the state |ψ⊥i 〉 is orthogonal to |ψi〉. When Alice obtains a
detection in the state |ψ⊥i 〉 (each with probability 13 ), she
is sending to Bob the state |ψi〉 where |ψ1〉 = |H〉, |ψ2〉 =
1
2 |H〉+
√
3
2 |V 〉, and |ψ3〉 = 12 |H〉 −
√
3
2 |V 〉. This opera-
tion corresponds to the random preparation, with equal
probability, of one of the three states {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉},
as in the prepare-and-measurement scheme of the R04
described in [9, 16]. Bob performs his measurements in
the same POVM as Alice {Πi}. After all measurements,
Bob and Alice compare the instants of their events, keep-
ing only those where both have a detection within a fixed
coincidence window.
Even if they have already exchanged all symbols, Alice
and Bob do not share any bit string yet, because each
state can mean both 0 or 1. Alice uses a QRNG to choose
HWP PBSpPBS
HWP PBSpPBS
TIMETAGGER
Alice
Bob
A1 A2
A3
B1 B2
B3
A1 A2
A3
B1 B2
B3
PBS
PBS
HWP d-HWP
PPKTP
L
DM
LD
HWPQWP QWP
SMF
SMF
PM-SMF
LPF
LPF
FIG. 2. Experimental setup used for the experiment. The
light issued by a laser diode (LD) at 404.5 nm is collected into
a polarization maintaining single mode fiber (PM-SMF) for
spatial mode filtering. The polarization is adjusted by a PBS
followed by a HWP and the beam is focused by a 200 mm lens
(L) into the center of the interferometer. The interferometer
is formed by a PBS, a dual-wavelength HWP (d-HWP) and
a PPKTP crystal, where the down-conversion takes place.
Photons exiting the interferometer are collected into single
mode fibers (SMF), preceded by a long-pass filter (LPF) to
filter out residual pump intensity. Fiber birefringence is com-
pensated by two quarter-wave plates (QWP) and a half-wave
plate (HWP). The receiver consists in an implementation of
the POVM {Πi}, with output Ai and Bi corresponding to
|ψ⊥i 〉 〈ψ⊥i | for, respectively, Alice and Bob. All the output
signals are timed by a common timetagger.
the bit value for each symbol. The combination of the
state and the bit value unambiguously determines the set
Si used for that event (for example, if Alice sends |ψ2〉
and the QRNG gives 1, the set used for that event is
S1). For each event, Alice tells Bob the corresponding
set by sending him the value of the index i. Bob uses
i to associate |ψ⊥2 〉 (for i = 1), |ψ⊥3 〉 (for i = 2), and
|ψ⊥1 〉 (for i = 3) with bit 0, and |ψ⊥1 〉 (for i = 1), |ψ⊥2 〉
(for i = 2), and |ψ⊥3 〉 (for i = 3) with bit 1. All other
combinations are marked as inconclusive, since Bob is
not able to determine the state sent by Alice. Bob tells
Alice which events are inconclusive and they both discard
them. They then estimate the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) from the fraction of inconclusive events [8, 9],
and use this information to distill the key using error
correction and privacy amplification [17].
B. Setup
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 2.
Entangled photon pairs are produced by using a 30 mm
periodically poled KTP crystal in a polarization-based
Sagnac interferometer [18, 19]. The source is pumped
with a continuous wave (CW) laser at 404.5 nm, with a
power of 3.5 mW. The down-converted photons have a
3central wavelength of 809 nm, with 0.2 nm full width at
half maximum (FWHM), and are collected into single-
mode fibers. In this configuration, the setup has a mean
coincidence rate of 29 kHz, with a 5% heralding ratio.
The fraction of multi-pair over one pair events, measured
by putting one output of the source into a Hanbury-
Brown-Twiss interferometer, is ∼ 3 · 10−3. Among these
events, only those which are partially correlated in the
polarization degree of freedom are exploitable by Eve
through the photon number splitting (PNS) attack [11].
The ratio of the number of these events to all multi-pair
ones is ζ ' τc∆t = 5·10−3, where τc = 8 ps is the coherence
time of down-converted photons and ∆t = 1.5 ns is the
coincidence window. The fraction of correlated multi-
photon events over the total number of detection events
is ∼ 1.5 · 10−5, thus the information leaked to Eve is
negligible. A set of two quarter-wave plates (QWP) and
one half-wave plate (HWP) is placed at the exit of the
fiber at Bob’s side in order to compensate polarization
rotations induced by fiber birefringence.
The receiving apparatus implementing the POVM
{Πi} consists of a partially polarizing beam-splitter
(pPBS), that completely transmits the horizontal polar-
ization and has a reflectivity of 66.7 % for the vertical
polarization, followed by a HWP at θ = 22.5◦ and a
polarizing beam-splitter (PBS). Given an arbitrary in-
put state |φ〉 = α |H〉 + β |V 〉, with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1,
the pPBS routes it to detector 1 with probability P1 =
2
3 |β|2. The state at the transmitting output of the pPBS,
α |H〉+ 1√
3
β |V 〉, is transformed into α |−〉+ 1√
3
β |+〉 =
1√
2
(α+ 1√
3
β) |H〉− 1√
2
(α− 1√
3
β) |V 〉 by the HWP. Thus,
the probabilities of a click at detectors 2 and 3 are, re-
spectively, P2 =
1
2 |α − 1√3β|2 and P3 = 12 |α + 1√3 |2. It
is easy to check that the above probabilities can be also
written as Pi = 〈φ|Πi |φ〉, with Πi = 23 |ψ⊥i 〉 〈ψ⊥i |: then,
the above described apparatus implements the POVM
{Πi}. Photons are detected using silicon single photon
counting modules (SPCM), characterized by a dead time
of 21 ns and a jitter of ∼ 800 ps FWHM. Detection events
are time-tagged with a resolution of 81 ps.
C. Data acquisition
A two hour continuous run of the apparatus has led to
the exchange of about 109 symbols within a coincidence
window of 1.5 ns. The events can be described as pairs
(Ai,Bj), with i the number of the detector clicking at Al-
ice’s side and j the one at Bob’s side. Event distribution
is shown in table I and Figure 3. After the collection of
all data, a QRNG [20] is used to generate the bit value
for each symbol. Coincidence events are then analyzed
using the sifting procedure summarized in Table II. The
events of the form (Ai,Bi) are bit errors, while the others
are either a “good” conclusive or an inconclusive result
according to Alice’s choice. The string of conclusive re-
sults gives the sifted key, from which a secret key can be
A1 A2 A3
B1 0.6 35.8 33.6
B2 35.1 0.6 32.8
B3 33.4 33.2 0.4
TABLE I. Total number of coincidences at the different de-
tectors (million events). The cell (Ai,Bj) corresponds to a
coincidence of Alice’s detector i and Bob’s detector j.
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FIG. 3. Total number of coincidences at the different detec-
tors. Full (red) bars correspond to detected events and (blue)
contours represent the expected number of detection events.
distilled using classical post-processing.
D. Secret key rate
Post-processing consists of a series of passages that
transform a partially correlated, partially secret key into
a new one Eve has negligible information of [16, 17]. The
effect of these tasks is a reduction of the number of bits
and can be quantified using the secret fraction r, defined
as the ratio between secure and conclusive bits [16]. In
the asymptotic limit of infinitely long key, the key frac-
tion of the R04 is given by [9]
r = 1− fECh(Q)− h
(
5
4
Q
)
, (2)
where fEC = 1.1 is the efficiency of the error correc-
tion protocol [21]. The number of secure bits is given by
Nconcr and, dividing it by the exposure time, the secret
key rate is obtained.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of the QBER and of the
key rate during a two hour acquisition. The slight re-
duction in the sifted key rate is probably due to a mis-
alignment in the fiber coupling of the entangled source.
The losses can be estimated from the ratio of coincidences
over single counts. The measured 5% heralding efficiency
corresponds to a total loss level of 13 dB, with a contri-
bution of 1.5 dB due to the POVM. The QBER is esti-
4Bit = 0 Bit = 1
A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3
B1 1 Inc 0 0 1 Inc
B2 0 1 Inc Inc 0 1
B3 Inc 0 1 1 Inc 0
TABLE II. Sifting procedure, according to the random choice
of the bit at Alice’s side (on the left for 0, on the right for 1).
The cell (Ai,Bj) stands for a coincidence between Alice’s de-
tector i and Bob’s detector j. Inconclusive events are marked
as “Inc”. The events in the diagonal (Ai,Bi) give an error
independently from the bit choice. The other combinations
(Ai,Bj), with i 6= j, are either a “good” conclusive or an in-
conclusive event, according to Alice’s choice.
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FIG. 4. Result obtained during 2 hour of continue acquisi-
tion. The time has been divided into 90 blocks of about 80 s
each, with a mean number of 1.1 · 106 sifted bits. The QBER
is estimated from inconclusive events, with Poissonian error
bars. The secret key rate is estimated for the case of infinitely
long key, using equation (2).
mated as Q = 1−2I1−I , where I is the fraction of incon-
clusive results [9]. The QBER remains almost constant
at a level below 2% for all the acquisition, thus confirm-
ing the stability of both the source and the POVM {Πi}
during the acquisition. The visibility of the source in
two mutually unbiased bases at the exit of the Sagnac
interferometer, before fiber injection, has been measured
to be between 97% and 98%: then the measured QBER
level can be attributed almost completely to the source.
A small contribution to the QBER is due to the small
imbalances between the different channels of the POVM
{Πi}. These values, estimated by computing the ratio
between the raw counts at the different detectors, vary
between 0.95 and 1.05, in line with what observed in the
previous implementation of the POVM [15].
In a real scenario, the number of exchanged signals is
always finite and the security analysis must take this fact
into account. The finite key analysis of the R04 protocol
is very similar to the one of the PBC00 [10], the only
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FIG. 5. Finite key analysis of the R04 protocol. The y-axis
represents the fraction of exchanged symbols giving a secure
bit. Each point is calculated using the first N collected data
for the estimation of the QBER. The security parameter for
both collective and general attacks is fixed to 4 · 10−10.
substantial difference lying in the estimation of the bit
error rate. The PBC00 estimates it by comparing part of
the sifted key through the public channel, while the R04
use the fraction of inconclusive results. The method is
based on the fact that the choice between “good” conclu-
sive and inconclusive results is given by a random event
at Alice’s side after the exchange of all the qubits, there-
fore Eve has no way of differentiate between the two and
their number is approximately equal [9]. Defining I the
fraction of inconclusive results, the fraction of “good”
conclusive ones can be written as (1 −Q)(1 − I). Using
the Hoeffding bound [22], the inequality
|(1−Q)(1− I)− I| ≤ ξ(,N) :=
√
2
N
log
2

(3)
is valid with probability at least 1 − . This implies
that, with the same probability, the QBER Q is less than
Q˜ := 1−2I+ξ(,N)1−I . The secret key fraction, in the case of
collective attacks, is [10, 11]
rcol =
[
1− h
(
5
4
Q˜
)]
− 7
√
1
N
log2
2
¯
− 1
N
log2
1
EC
− 1
N
log2
2
PA
− fECh(Q) (4)
for N exchanged signals, with security parameter col :=
¯+ EC + PA + PE . This result can be extended to the
case of general attacks by exploiting the postselection
technique [12], giving [10]
rgen = rcol − 6 log2 (N + 1)
N
, (5)
with security parameter gen = (N + 1)
3col.
Figure 5 shows the secret key fraction of the R04 pro-
tocol in the finite key scenario. For each point, both
the QBER and the number of conclusive events is eval-
uated on the first N exchanged symbols. The secret
5key fraction is calculated by using equations (4) and (5).
For collective attacks, the chosen security parameter is
col = 4 · 10−10, with ¯ = EC = PA = PE = 10−10.
The same value has been chosen for gen, therefore the
term rcol of equation (5) is calculated using ¯ = EC =
PA = PE =
10−10
(N+1)3 . The plots show that at least
104 - 105 signals are necessary to exchange a key, while
already N = 106 (slightly more than half a minute at
29 kHz) gives a reasonable key fraction. The difference
between the key fraction for collective and general at-
tacks is more marked for lower values of N and tends to
disappear for large number of exchanged symbols, where
both approach the asymptotic key fraction.
III. DISCUSSION
In this work, we demonstrated the experimental fea-
sibility of the equiangular three state QKD protocol
R04. We showed that the scheme proposed by [15] for
the POVM is suitable for applications in Quantum Key
Distribution. State preparation was simplified by using
an entanglement-based version of the protocol, with the
same POVM at both Alice’s and Bob’s side. We also
showed that the estimation of the bit error rate from in-
conclusive results is feasible in the finite key scenario.
The implemented scheme was demonstrated to be sta-
ble and highly reliable, allowing a two hour data ac-
quisition without any significative change in the QBER
value. The performance of the protocol is comparable
with the BB84, despite the less efficient parameter esti-
mation, both in the asymptotic limit and for finite key.
Its simpler receiving apparatus, requiring only three sin-
gle photon detectors, makes it a valid alternative to cur-
rent implementations of QKD based on the BB84 proto-
col. Finally, this work extends the experimental investi-
gation of equiangular spherical codes to a still uncovered
area of quantum information: quantum key distribution.
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